

SECRET

25X1

11 October 1962

BRIEFING FOR CINCLANT AND STRICOM PLANNERS

Gentlemen, the purpose of this briefing is to present a picture of Cuban military capabilities as of the period 1960-1961 for background, as of today for current planning, and an estimate of what the Cuban order of battle will be next year, in the summer of 1963.

In 1960 the revolutionary Army consisted of the Ground Forces, six Rural Police regiments, and the Army Air Force, under the command of Raul Castro. The Rural Police were not combat troops. They were dispersed throughout Cuba in small Cuartels. Each Rural Police Regiment had police jurisdiction over one of the six military districts. Combat training was inadequate and units of the Army had not participated in field maneuvers. Combat effectiveness was poor, even by Latin American standards.

At the end of 1960 and the beginning of 1961 the first of Soviet Bloc weapons began to flow into Cuba. Tanks, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, automatic weapons for ground troops, and aircraft arrived, and the task of training Cuban soldiers in their use began under the tutelage of Soviet Bloc instructors. The Navy, which had been decimated following Castro's takeover, began to reorganize with politically reliable personnel, and the new Cuban Ground Forces based on three territorial commands began to form. By the time of the Bay of Pigs disaster, however, very few military units had been trained in the use of their new weaponry and Castro could only get six aircraft into the air. As it turned out, with no air cover, it was sufficient to destroy the invasion effort.

Since May 1961, the Cuban Ground Forces have developed into a standing army of about 75,000 men and a ready reserve of about 100,000 men. There is also a home guard of 100,000 men. By now the ground forces have received intensive training in the use of Bloc-supplied arms and equipment and tactical training through the battalion combat team level. Great attention has been paid to the political indoctrination of troops. It has acquired capabilities for the combat employment of armor and artillery, including anti-tank and conventional antiaircraft weapons hitherto unknown in Latin America. There are some 265 battalions in the Cuban ground forces including the ready reserve. A full strength battalion consists of about 1,000 men. However, battalions vary greatly in strength and efficiency. The over-all strength of the ground forces is probably sufficient to repel any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength.

A new Cuban Air Force has been created. The Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF) like the Army has been reorganized and supplied with Soviet equipment and Bloc training during the past two years. The Air Force is apparently organized into 1 Fighter Regiment (MIG 15/17/19) based at San Antonio de los Baños, 2 Fighter Squadrons (MIG 15/17/21) based at Santa Clara Airfield, 1 Fighter Squadron (MIG 15/17) based at Camaguey Airfield, and 1 Utility Unit (IL-14, MI-1, MI-4) based at Playa Baracoa Airfield. An ambitious training program is underway designated to give the CRAF a fully operational capability at an early date. We believe these units have a limited capability at this time.

It is estimated that the CRAF now has a total of at least 60 MIG 15/17/19's. In addition they have recently received at least 25 MIG-21's and 10 IL-28's in crates. Only one MIG-21 is known to be fully assembled; the rest are either still crated or in some stage of assembly. None of the IL-28's have been assembled.

DIA review(s) completed.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

The CRAF also still has 17 B-26's and 8 to 10 Sea Fury MK-1's (prop subsonic fighter). It has 25-30 assorted US-made transports plus 11 IL-14's which belong to the civil airline Cubana but could probably be used by the CRAF. At least 3 additional IL-14's are believed to have been received recently. There are a total of 35 helicopters of which 12 are MI-4's and 11 MI-1's. The CRAF has 27 various type trainers only 4 of which are jet (T-33). Additional aircraft and helicopters apparently are being received. The addition of the MIG-21's to the operational inventory will greatly enhance their air defense capability. Inclusion of the IL-28's will provide an air support interdiction capability.

Radar equipments of various types have been present in Cuba for some time. The effectiveness with which the EW/GCI capability has been tied into an integrated air defense system is not discernible at this time. Training with this system is probably underway but it will be some time before the operational efficiency of the system becomes apparent. Radars have been identified which could perform at least the functions of early warning, acquisition and guidance for the SA-2 SAM missile system as well as conventional antiaircraft fire control. These radars, by nickname, are listed below:

Token; Knife Rest A and B; possibly Wood Gage; Spoon Rest; Fruit Set; Track Dish; Whiff; and Fire Can.

Although the Cubans are considered proficient in the use of AAA weapons, they are not believed to be fully trained and familiar with fire control equipment associated with the AAA. Therefore, we believe that the effectiveness of their AAA would be much better under visual than all-weather conditions. AAA equipment is generally dispersed throughout Cuba to defend airfields, ports, army installations and beaches, with concentrations in the Havana and Guantanamo areas. (See map showing AAA OB). The SAM defenses now under construction, (shown on the map,) are dispersed throughout the island and when operational will further enhance their air defense capability.

The Cuban Air Force is estimated to have a personnel strength of between 2,420 and 3,750 divided as follows:

Associated with MIG program	Flying Pers	600-800
	Maint Pers	800-1100
	Grd support	<u>200-500</u>
	Totals	1600-2400
Associated w/Helicopter and Mis Acft	Flying Pers	80-120
		100-150
		<u>20-50</u>
	Totals	200-320
Associated w/radar		620-1030

The extent to which Soviet personnel are involved in CRAF activities is not clear. Soviet personnel are known to be engaged in training; they may be being used as pilots and in the operation of radar, SAM, and AAA equipment.

Along with the build-up of the Cuban Air Force, there has been an effort to augment Cuban air facilities. Several new airfields have been built, including one at Santa Clara with a 10,400 ft. runway, and many of the already existing facilities have been

SECRET

DF-16 25X1

SECRET

significantly improved, including a new 8,800 ft. runway at Holguin. There are indications that this runway either has been or is being extended to 10,000 ft. The existence of military fields with 10,000 feet runways cannot be explained by the needs of existing aircraft.

Cuba now has seven airfields with runways over 8,000 ft. and 12 with runways between 5,000 ft. and 8,000 ft.; although two of these--San Francisco in eastern Cuba and El Jiqui in the Cienaga de Zapata area--still have dirt runways. There are indications of construction activity at San Julian in western Cuba, which has been inoperative for the past year because of the poor condition of the runways.

At least half, and possibly more, of these fields are capable of supporting jet fighter operations, although MIG's are known to be based only at San Antonio de los Banos in the Havana area and at Camaguey and Santa Clara in Central Cuba and it is anticipated that they will be based at Holguin. These and other major fields such as Los Canos in eastern Cuba and those in the Havana area could support light bomber operations. Santa Clara and Holguin are capable of supporting heavier bomber operations.

In addition to the major airfields, there are a number of airfields with less than 5,000 ft. Most of these are located in the Guantanamo area and, for the most part, have dirt runways. While some of them conceivably could be capable of supporting jet operations, their military significance has not yet become apparent.

In general, parking and field facilities have been improved, but, except for the major airfields, they are still believed to be relatively limited.

As in the case of the Air Force, a new Navy is being developed. Formerly coastal patrol was accomplished by militiamen in confiscated fishing and pleasure craft. Now the Soviet Bloc has provided 14 to 16 guided missile Komar class boats, 16 "P-6" class motor torpedo boats, three or four Soviet "PO-2" class patrol craft and six large Soviet submarine chasers of the "Kronshtat" class. This has added to their collection of 30 to 35 miscellaneous patrol and auxiliary small craft and the three US patrol escort class ships already in their order of battle.

This brings us to the current missile build-up in Cuba. So far a total of 20 SA-2 antiaircraft missile sights have been confirmed, as well as three cruise-type coastal defense missile sights. A fourth facility which may become a coastal defense sight has been located. The SA-2 sites are at different stages, varying from early construction to possibly operational. The Coastal Defense site at Banos, on the eastern end of the island, is probably partially operational.

The estimated strength of the Cuban Armed Forces for the summer of 1963 is as follows:

- (a) No change in number of ground force personnel.
- (b) A total of 24 to 36 SA-2 missile sites.
- (c) 20 to 30 coastal defense sites.
- (d) The Air Force will have between 2,500 and 4,000 personnel and these aircraft:

84 MIG 15/17 and 19's.
24 to 36 MIG 21's and
8 B-26's.

- (e) the Navy will have 4 to 5,000 men and:

10 Kronshtadt patrol craft
16 PC patrol boats
24 Komar class guided missile boats
The 3 US patrol escort ships and their present small craft.

SECRET

Finally, a word about potential anti-Castro resistance from within Cuba: It is estimated that most of the 80% of the Cuban population who are against the Castro Regime are apathetic and passive because of the repressive measures of the police state and the fact that since the Bay of Pigs tragedy there has never been a dramatic incident to spark hopes for an ultimate overthrow of the Communist regime. For planning purposes, resistance from within Cuba to support any US action will depend mostly upon the degree to which the Cuban people can be convinced at the outset that the effort is not another unsupported exile action but is the action of forces in sufficient strength of the United States government capable of causing the downfall of the Castro regime. The same applies to defections in the Cuban Armed Forces. If the Armed Forces were convinced for example, that they were up against a full US intervention in strength, large-scale defections could be expected.